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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the Utah Const, art. VIII# § 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1953, as amended).

This matter has been transferred to

the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j)
(1953, as amended), and Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the court erred in finding that the method used

by North Park Village Cooperative ("North Park") in foreclosing
the interests of Rhodes and Nalder was commercially reasonable.
The standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard
to the extent that the court's ruling is a finding of fact. The
standard of review is the "correctness" standard to the extent
that the court's finding is a conclusion of law.

Saunders v.

Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether North Park's method of repossessing the leases

of the other plaintiffs, and leasing of the apartment units during the pendency of this lawsuit in mitigation of its damages,
precludes judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgments.
The standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard
to the extent that the court's ruling is a finding of fact. The
standard of review is the "correctness" standard to the extent
that the court's finding is a conclusion of law.

Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
North Park believes that Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-504 and
-507(2) are determinative of the first issue relating to the
foreclosure of the interests of Rhodes and Nalder.

Utah Code

Ann. § 70A-9-505(2) is determinative of the second issue.

These

statutes are reproduced in Appendix 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Naiture of the Case and Disposition Below.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed in May of 1988.l

The

plaintiffs sought cancellation of the proprietary leases and
promissory notes, and rescission of the transactions, and also
alleged breach of contract, failure to account for rents
received, mismanagement, fraud and misrepresentation, conspiracy
and a failure of consideration.

North Park counterclaimed

against the plaintiffs that had defaulted on their promissory
notes and proprietary leases.

This matter was tried before the

Second District Court, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, without
a jury, on September 18 and 19, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, the trial court issued its decision
finding against plaintiffs, no cause of action, on all of their
claims, and finding for North Park on its counterclaim.

Judge

*Prior to trial, North Park settled with some of the
original plaintiffs. Since trial, and as of the date hereof,
North Park has settled with all of the remaining plaintiffs and
appellants except for Rhodes, Nalder, the Miyatakes, the
Hunsakers, the Tanners, and Shahidinejad.
-2-

Cornaby then issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
(reproduced in Appendix 2) and entered Judgment against plaintiffs and in favor of North Park on January 8, 1992.
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court on February 6, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court poured-over
the case to the Court of Appeals on June 22, 1992.
Plaintiffs have raised no argument on appeal regarding the
correctness of the trial court's ruling on the complaint. The
issues on appeal involve only the defendant's right to recover on
the counterclaim.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Prior to 1980, Gregland Investment ("Gregland") had built
and was operating a 72 unit apartment complex in North Salt Lake
City, Utah.

R. 704.2

In approximately early 1980, Gregland

decided to form a cooperative apartment project, which was called
North Park Village Cooperative.

R. 704. Although the idea of a

cooperative apartment complex is relatively new to Utah, cooperatives have been successfully used on the East Coast.

R. 705.

On April 8, 1980, North Park entered into a "Proprietary
Lease" with Gregland (Exhibit P-2), pursuant to which the 72
dwelling units comprising the apartment complex were leased to
North Park by Gregland, as and when North Park was able to

2

As to those facts not at issue on appeal, reference is
typically made to the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, R. 703-714.
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sublease each unit to a member.

R. 705. The purchase price

payable to Gregland by North Park for the Proprietary Lease was
$35,000 per unit, payable either in cash or on terms.

R. 705.

North Park marketed proprietary leases to prospective members of the cooperative.

R. 705. Each purchaser of a proprie-

tary lease received a membership stock certificate and was
subject to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and rules and
regulations of the cooperative.

R. 705-06.

Each of the plaintiffs or plaintiff couples acquired a
proprietary lease.

R. 706. Most acquired their leases directly

from North Park, although several plaintiffs acquired them from
previous owners.

R. 706.

Each of the plaintiffs signed a

promissory note in favor of North Park, or assumed liability for
payment of a promissory note, representing the balance of the
purchase price owed to North Park for the proprietary lease.

R.

706.
The promissory notes were secured by the proprietary leases
cicquired by the plaintiffs.

Each of the notes contained the

following provision:
SECURITY - for this promissory note shall be a
collateral pledge of a certain proprietary farm lease
and its resulting leasehold provided by Northpark
Village Coop for Unit #
. Repossession of the
collateral above and resulting resale may not satisfy
this note and in that case a deficiency judgment may be
sought against the payee [sic] for additional sums for
satisfaction of this note and costs. Upon satisfaction
of the sums described herein, the security shall be
reassigned to the payee [sic].

-4-

Each of the plaintiffs, except those settling prior to
trial, ceased making payments to North Park on their notes and
failed to pay maintenance fees due under the proprietary leases,
R. 708, 710.

In each case, North Park sent notices of termina-

tion to the plaintiffs, the basic form of which was as follows:
NOTICE OF TERMINATION
To:

(Unit Holder and Address)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you are in default under
the terms of your Proprietary Lease due to your failure
to pay sums due under the Proprietary Lease and
Promissory Note. As of the date of this Notice,
monthly carrying charges in the amount of $
,
and lease payments in the amount of $
are
due and owing to North Park Village Cooperative.
You are further given notice that your Proprietary
Lease and all of your rights under that Agreement will
expire ten (10) days after service of this Notice on
you, unless, in the meantime, your defaults under this
Agreement have been cured. Should these defaults not
be cured and this Agreement expire, you will be deemed
a tenant at will and are further given notice to remove
yourself from the premises.
This Notice is given pursuant to Article 14 of the
Proprietary Lease between you and North Park Village
Cooperative.
DATED this

day of

, 19

.

NORTH PARK VILLAGE COOPERATIVE
BY
R. 708; Tr. 149, 243, 280.
In January of 1988, North Park decided to foreclose on many
of the plaintiffs' proprietary leases by public sale (not all
were in default).

Notices of the sale were sent to each of the

-5-

plaintiffs, including Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder.
353.

R. 709; Tr. at

Rhodes and Nalder received the Notice of Public Sale,

together with a letter advising them of the sale and their right
to redeem the collateral at any time prior to the sale.

R. 53,

139-145, 151; Tr. at 244. The Notice of Public Sale (Ex. D-5)
was also published in the Davis County Clipper for three consecutive weeks on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1988.
R. 709.

Prior to the scheduled sale, North Park's management and

board of directors received reports and communications from
various parties claiming that the proposed sales were improper.
Tr. at 343-44, 356-57.

North Park decided to proceed with the

sale of only the cooperative apartment unit of Randy Rhodes and
Scott Nalder, basically as a test.

Tr. at 344.

Mr. Rhodes was in attendance at the public sale.
244.

The sale was conducted by public auction.

Tr. at

North Park was

the successful bidder, acquiring the proprietary lease for the
sum of $26,500. R. 709. Mr. Gregerson testified, and the trial
court held, that the bid amount was the fair market value of the
cooperative cipartment unit at the time of the sale.

Tr. at 346,

R. 710.
When this lawsuit was later brought in May of 19 88, North
Park counterclaimed for the amounts owed on the notes and for
judicial foreclosure of the proprietary leases remaining as
collateral.

With respect to Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, North

Park sought a judgment on the promissory note, after application

-6-

of the proceeds of the public sale, in the sum of $7,328.48, plus
interest and attorneys' fees.

R. 43-146.

In their Reply to

Counterclaim, the plaintiffs denied they were in default on the
notes or leases.

R. 150.

After default and after having sent the notices of termination, North Park took steps to mitigate its damages as a result
of plaintiffs' defaults by collecting rents and renting plaintiffs' units to third parties.

Such efforts continued during the

pendency of this action until the trial court ruled for North
Park below.

R. 709.

From the rental proceeds, North Park

collected its rental costs, including a monthly maintenance fee,
as well as other costs of its mitigation efforts, such as cleaning, advertising, etc.

Tr. at 356. R. 709.

In each instance,

the monthly maintenance fees and other rental costs were recouped
from rents generated from North Park's mitigation efforts,
resulting in a net benefit to the plaintiffs from North Park's
mitigation efforts.

R. 709.

In calculating its damages at

trial, North Park gave plaintiffs credit for those net benefits
achieved through its mitigation efforts.

Ex. D-7; Tr. at 310.

The trial court found against the plaintiffs on the
Complaint, no cause of action, and held that North Park was
entitled to recover on the notes. As to the foreclosure of the
proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, the court found
that the sale was a "public sale," which was "in all material
respects conducted in a commercially reasonably manner."

-7-

R. 709,

712,

As to the other plaintiffs, the judgment provided that

their proprietary leases would be sold at a sheriff's sale and
the proceeds of the sale applied against the indebtedness, costs
of sale and attorneys' fees,

R. 715-19.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By this appeal, plaintiffs seek only to avoid deficiency
judgments on the promissory notes.

Plaintiffs Rhodes and Nalder

assert that North Park failed to conduct the public sale in a
"commercially reasonable manner," thus barring a deficiency
judgment.

That argument fails for two reasons.

First, the trial

court concluded after hearing the evidence, that the sale of
Messrs. Rhodes' and Nalder's Proprietary Lease was a public sale,
"in all material respects conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner."

The Court's conclusion is based upon substantial

evidence, unrefuted at trial, that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder
received personal notice of the sale, the sale wais advertised for
three consecutive weeks in the Davis County Clipper, a newspaper
of general circulation in the county where the property was
located, Mr. Rhodes was present at the sale, and the sale was
conducted by public auction.

Second, plaintiffs Rhodes and

Nalder suffered no damage, loss, or prejudice even if the procedure was defective, since North Park bought the collateral at the
foreclosure sale for its fair market value.

-8-

The remaining plaintiffs assert that no deficiency judgment
may be taken against them due to alleged irregularities in North
Park's actions in giving notices of termination and in leasing
the units pending a judicial decision.

The plaintiffs assert

that by reason of North Park's actions, the collateral somehow
became worthless, or that North Park should be deemed to have
accepted the collateral in full satisfaction of the notes.
The plaintiffs' arguments fail for several reasons. First,
the notices of termination did not make the collateral worthless
or impair their values in any respect, but merely terminated the
plaintiffs' right to use and occupancy of the premises as a
preliminary step to North Park's realizing upon its collateral
through resale. After judgment, the leases could be sold and
conveyed to the purchasers at the Sheriff's sales.

Second, North

Park never provided plaintiffs with written notice of its
intention to retain the proprietary leases in satisfaction of
plaintiffs' debts, as Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-505(2) requires.
Third, North Park's operation of the apartment units during the
pendency of this lawsuit was an appropriate and beneficial effort
to mitigate its damages.

-9-

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
SALE OF MESSRS. RHODES' AND NALDER'S PROPRIETARY LEASE WAS CONDUCTED IN A COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE MANNER.
The public sale of the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes
and Nalder was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.
The undisputed evidence was that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder
received personal written notice of the sale.

The sale was

advertised for three consecutive weeks in the Davis County
Clipper, a newspaper of general circulation in Davis County, the
county in which the property is situated, basically in the manner
required for sales under trust deeds.
Mr. Rhodes was in attendance at the sale.

The sale occurred

at North Park and was conducted by public auction.

North Park

acquired the collateral for a bid of $26,500, which the trial
court found was the fair market value of the collateral on the
date of sale.

In presenting that evidence, North Park met its

burden of establishing that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-504 (1953).

FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590

P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (secured party has burden of proving
sale was commercially reasonable).
Notwithstanding that evidence, plaintiffs assert on appeal
that the sale was not commercially reasonable.

-10-

Plaintiffs,

however, refer to no evidence to contradict the foregoing facts.
They only assert that the notice of sale was not designed to
attract purchasers "because each successful bidder was required
to execute the proprietary lease purchased and be bound by its
terms, including the obligation to pay monthly maintenance fees
in perpetuity."

Appellants' Br. pp. 13-14.

The notices of sale, however, accurately described what was
for sale, i.e., a proprietary lease, which contained certain
obligations that the purchaser would be bound to, including the
obligation to pay maintenance fees.

It would be totally anoma-

lous to suggest that the notice of sale was deficient because it
accurately described the collateral to be sold.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has described a public sale
for commercial reasonableness purposes, as follows:
A public sale after default "has traditionally meant 'a
sale in which the public, upon proper notice is invited
to participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a
competitive basis for the property placed on sale,
which is sold to the highest bidder.'" The requirement
of a public invitation is essential for a public sale
under the Uniform Commercial Code. It is fundamental
that a public sale presupposes posting public notices
or advertising. The Restatement of Security § 48,
Comment (1941) defines a public sale as "one to which
the public is invited by advertisement to appear and
bid at auction for the goods to be sold."
Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee. 649 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah
1982) (citations omitted).
In Pioneer Dodge, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's holding that the sale of a truck was commercially

-11-

reasonable because the only efforts to obtain buyers consisted of
taking the truck to a few car lots and obtaining oral bids of
undisclosed amounts; placing the truck on the a car lot for a few
days; and announcing the sale over the dealer's loudspeaker
immediately prior thereto.

Id.

at 31.

Similarly, in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d
803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that a sale of
equipment Wcis not commercially reasonable where the secured party
did not advertise the sale, but only contacted three dealers of
which one had no intent to make a serious bid and the other two
bid almost as low as the first, in order to resell the equipment
for a profit.

The result was that the equipment was sold for an

amount which was less than one-half of the amount of the secured
party's own appraisal completed just a few months before.
The facts in this case stand in stark contraist to those set
forth in Pioneer Dodge and FMA Financial Corp.

Here, the sale was

advertised for three consecutive weeks in the Davis County
Clipper.

That is the same form of published notice required to be

provided in ai trust deed foreclosure proceeding or in execution
sales of real estate pursuant to Rule 69 (e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Moreover, the sale was conducted by public auction.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2) (1953) (a sale in conformity
with usual manner and practice is commercially reasonable).
The facts in this case are similar to those in Brigham Truck
and Implement Co. v. Fridall, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1987).

-12-

In

Brigham Truck, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
entry of a deficiency judgment after a resale of the collateral
where the secured party provided actual written notice to the
debtor and advertised the sale on the radio and in the Box Elder
News and Journal for two consecutive weeks and The Leader, a
Tremonton newspaper, also for two weeks.
Even if the court were to consider North Park's efforts to
advertise the property as deficient, however, North Park proved
that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder suffered no loss as a result,
since the collateral sold for its fair value.
Utah Supreme Court in Brigham Truck:

As stated by the

"Of primary importance are

the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair price for the
collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise notifying
potential buyers that the collateral is for sale."

Id. at 1172

(citing Haggis Management Inc. v. Turtle Management, 745 P.2d 442
(Utah 1985) (emphasis added)).

In this case, North Park bought

the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder at the sale
for $26,500, the undisputed fair market value of the proprietary
lease at the time of the sale.

Because the amount paid for the

proprietary lease at the sale equals the fair market value
thereof, plaintiffs were in no way prejudiced by the manner in
which the sale occurred.
In Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469 (Utah
1987), the debtor sought a reversal of a deficiency judgment
against him in favor of Security State Bank.

-13-

Debtor claimed that

the bank's notice was technically deficient because the sale was
held after the date stated in the notice.

That technical defici-

ency notwithstanding, the Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's entry of a deficiency judgment, noting that the debtor
had shown no prejudice or harm suffered from the delay in the
sale.

"Indeed, the evidence presented by the bank indicates that

the debtor was advantaged by the late sale because the bank was
able to achieve an unusually high price, more than $1,000 over
blue book value, for the truck by waiting to sell it."
47.

Id. at

See also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah

1985) (notwithstanding deficient notices of sale, deficiency
judgment affirmed because collateral was sold for $2,000 more
than a bid approved by the debtor); Chrysler Dodge Country v.
Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 542 (Utah App. 1989) (notwithstanding no
advertising of sale, deficiency judgment affirmed because "the
selling price was higher than the price Chrysler Dodge had
arrived at after using N.A.D.A. pricing book and other price
factors") .
As in Security State Bank, Scharf and Chrysler Dodge
Country, North Park paid an objectively fair price for the proprietary lease.

The payment of that fair market value by North

Park at the foreclosure sale conclusively establishes that the
purpose of the commercially reasonable standard has been met.
Because there is substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court with respect to the sale

-14-

of the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, and
because plaintiffs neither cite nor refer to any evidence or case
law that would controvert those findings and conclusions, the
judgment against Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder should be affirmed.
II
NORTH PARK'S REPOSSESSION AND MITIGATION
EFFORTS DO NOT PRECLUDE NORTH PARK FROM
JUDICIALLY FORECLOSING PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS
AND OBTAINING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS.
The plaintiffs allege on appeal that actions by North Park,
as well as the lengthy pendency of this action, somehow rendered
the collateral for the notes worthless, thus barring a deficiency
judgment in favor of North Park.3

As the procedure followed and

notices given by North Park in pursuance of a recovery on the
collateral did not impair the collateral or prejudice plaintiffs
in any respect, plaintiffs' defense should be rejected.
Preliminary to seeking to recover on the collateral pledged
for the notes, North Park was obliged to take possession of the
collateral in some fashion.

The proprietary leases specified, in

Article 14, that a ten day notice and opportunity to cure was
required.

North Park gave such notice through the notices of

termination.
3

Plaintiffs' argument that the notices of termination
somehow made the collateral worthless was not raised as a defense
to the counterclaim or listed as a contested issue in the
pretrial order. R. 147-52, 636-38. The argument first appears
in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief. R. 605-610.
-15-

Plaintiffs' assertion that the notices of termination in
some way impaired the collateral (the proprietary leases) misses
the mark.

The notices did not extinguish the proprietary leases,

but rather only terminated the plaintiff's right to use and
occupancy of the premises as a preliminary step to North Park's
realizing upon its collateral through resale.

Further, the

notices of termination did not relinquish any claims, and did not
destroy or impair North Park's ability to resell the proprietary
leases.
Article 14 of the proprietary leases, referred to in the
notices of termination, specifically provides for the notices of
termination and grants North Park, after such termination, a
right "to repossess."

Article 14 neither expressly nor impliedly

waives any claim North Park may have to collect on the promissory
notes or past due maintenance fees.

Article 14 also states that

the relationship is that of landlord and tenant, further buttressing North Park's right, and obligation, to obtain "possession"
of the leasehold before trying to realize upon the collateral.
Clearly, North Park could not foreclose on the leases without
first obtaining possessory rights.

C£. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12

(1953) (willful exclusion of tenant without judicial process
prohibited).
In addition, each promissory note states that it is secured
by the proprietary lease and provides for "repossession,"
"resulting resale," and the ability to obtain a "deficiency

-16-

judgment" thereafter.

It is therefore apparent from the docu-

ments, construed together (as the plaintiffs at trial asserted
they should be), that the notices of termination were merely a
step in the repossession and resale process.4
Furthermore, as a practical matter, there has been no
impairment of the collateral.

Except for the Rhodes and Nalder

lease, none of the proprietary leases was disposed of prior to
judgment.

There is no evidence that the proprietary leases could

not therefore be transferred to purchasers at the execution sales
ordered by the trial court.

There is also no evidence that the

values of the leases are any less than they otherwise would be
but for some act of North Park.
Plaintiffs' position is contrary to this court's
observation:
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the
document itself, and it should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of
its parts should be given effect insofar as that is
possible.
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

If plaintiffs' interpretation of the

several agreements is correct, such that the proprietary leases
truly were extinguished, then all of the provisions of the
agreements relating to North Park's security interest would be
4

Plaintiffs' complaint itself acknowledges that the leases
were still extant; otherwise, plaintiffs would not have requested
rescission of the transactions.
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nullified.

Completely nullifying the security aspects of the

agreements was not the intent of the parties.
Plaintiffs also suggest that North Park has retained the
units in satisfaction of its claims, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-505 (1953), which sets forth the procedure for a secured
party to propose retention of collateral in satisfaction and
discharge of a debt.

The statute provides that a secured party

may elect to retain collateral in satisfaction of an obligation
by submitting a proposal to that effect to the debtor in writing,
to which the debtor may object.

North Park never provided any

written notice to plaintiffs proposing to retain the proprietary
leases in satisfaction of the debts; furthermore, the notices of
termination cannot be construed as such since they did not propose any relinquishment or satisfaction of claims, and did not
destroy or impair North Park's ability to resell the proprietary
leases.

There is nothing in the notices of termination or in

North Park's actions or inaction, including its mitigation
efforts before and during the pendency of this action, expressly
or impliedly manifesting an intent to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt.

See IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776

P.2d 607 (Utah 1989).
Plaintiffs' assertion that North Park operated the cooperative apartment units as its own is a simple mislabeling of North
Park's efforts to mitigate its damages.

North Park simply col-

lected rents and attempted to lease the units to third parties.
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As rents were collected and when cooperative apartment units were
leased by North Park through its mitigation efforts, North Park
credited plaintiffs for those rents in order to offset the maintenance fees accruing under the proprietary leases, and to pay
rental expenses incurred.
From the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that North Park
never intended to accept the repossessed proprietary leases in
full satisfaction of the amounts owing under the proprietary
leases and the promissory notes. The District Court did not err
in awarding North Park its judicial sale remedy and right to
deficiency judgments against plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, North Park respectfully requests
this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court, and to
remand for the purpose of fixing the amount of attorneys' fees to
be awarded defendant in connection with this appeal.
DATED this

^

day of July, 1992.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Bryce Dy Panzer
David wC^Steffensen
Attorneys for Appellee

(Original Signature)
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Appendix 1
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease
or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in
its then condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing.
* * *

(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor
for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the
underlying transaction was the sale of accounts or
chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or
is liable for any deficiency only if the security
agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by
public or private proceedings and may be made by way of
one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place
and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or
is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a
statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other
notification need be sent. . . .
A secured party may
buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a
type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a
type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations, he may buy at a private sale.
*

*

•

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-505(2):
In any other case involving consumer goods or any
other collateral, a secured party in possession may,

after default, propose to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such
a proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has not
signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this section. In the case of
consumer goods no other notice need be given. In other
cases notice shall be sent to any other secured party
from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notice to the debtor or before the debtor's
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim
of an interest in the collateral. If the secured party
receives objection in writing from a person entitled to
receive notification within twenty-one days after the
notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the
collateral under § 70A-9-504. In the absence of such
written objection secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2):
The fact that a better price could have been
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is
not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was
not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the
secured party either sells the collateral in the usual
manner in any recognized market therefore or if he
sells at the price current in such market at the time
of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially
reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two
proceeding sections with respect to sales also apply as
may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A
disposition which has been approved in any judicial
proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or
representative of creditors shall conclusively be
deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this section
does not indicate that any such approval must be
obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any
disposition not so approved is not commercially
reasonable.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RANDY L. RHODES, SCOTT N.
NALDER, FAYE COLTON (MOORE),
SEAN MOORE, JAMES D. OVENDEN,
DONNA McQUISTON (OVENDEN),
ROLAND and ALISON TANNER, M.D.
and JOLENE S. SWENSEN, HERBERT
and HARRIET GOLDMAN, GREG and
BRENDA MIYATAKE, RALPH and
JOYCE FRASIER, MARK C. and
JOYCE K. HUNSAKER, LANDON and
MARIE MORRELL, ZOHREH
SHAHIDINEJAD, DENNIS F. and
SHARON F. REEVES, BRIAN
CARMACK, BEN J. and CHERYL
HEROLD, THOMAS and KAROL PACE,
and CONNIE PARKER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 43583
Judge Cornaby

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE NORTH PARK VILLAGE
COOPERATIVE,
Defendant.

This action came on for trial before the above-entitled
court on September 18 and 19, 1991, the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby, District Court Judge, presiding.

Bryce E. Roe and

Kathleen H. Switzer of Fabian and Clendenin appeared on behalf of

the plaintiffs, and Bryce D. Panzer of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau appeared on behalf of the defendant.

Witnesses were

sworn and examined, and the Court had an opportunity to observe
their demeanor and credibility.

Exhibits and stipulations of

counsel were also received into evidence.

The Court issued a

written decision on the matter on October 25, 1991. The Court
now makes and enters the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Gregland Investments ("Gregland") is ci partnership of

S. Arthur Gregerson, his wife, Montess, and their five children.
Prior to 1980, Gregland had built and was operating a seventy-two
unit apartment complex in North Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Gregland executed a Deed of Trust on the apartment

complex to Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company (Exhibit D-l) to
secure a Promissory Note in the original amount of $825,000,
dated May 14, 1979 (Exhibit P-7).
3.

In approximately early 1980, Gregland decided to form a

cooperative apartment project, as a means of selling the
apartments without activating the due-on-sale clause contained in
the Trust Deed to Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company.
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4.

Although the idea of a cooperative apartment complex is

relatively new to Utah, cooperatives have been successfully used
on the East Coast.
5.

On April 8, 1980, North Park Village Cooperative

("NPVC") entered into a "Proprietary Lease" with Gregland
(Exhibit P-2).
6.

S. Arthur Gregerson, Montess Gregerson# and Gene Curtis

executed and filed Articles of Incorporation for NPVC with the
State of Utah, and a Certificate of Incorporation for NPVC was
issued May 22, 1980 (Exhibit P-l).
7.

Pursuant to the Proprietary Lease between Gregland and

NPVC, dated April 8, 1980, the seventy-two dwelling units
comprising NPVC were leased to NPVC by Gregland, as and when NPVC
was able to sublease each unit to a member.
8.

The purchase price payable by NPVC for the Proprietary

Lease was $35,000 per unit, payable either in cash or over time.
The Proprietary Lease also stated that payments and payoffs would
be figured on a per unit basis.
9.

Pursuant to the Proprietary Lease, NPVC was entitled to

acquire the property upon payment in full of the amounts owed for
the Proprietary Lease, plus $1.00.
10.

NPVC marketed proprietary leases to prospective members

of the cooperative.

Each purchaser of a proprietary lease was to

receive a membership stock certificate.

-3-

Each unit leaseholder

was subject to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Rules
and Regulations of NPVC.
11.

Each of the plaintiffs or plaintiff couples acquired a

proprietary lease from NPVC. Most of the plaintiffs acquired
their proprietary leases from NPVC directly, although several of
the plaintiffs acquired them from other owners.
12.

Each of the plaintiffs signed a promissory note in

favor of NPVC, representing the balance of the purchase price
owed to NPVC for the proprietary lease.

In those instances where

a unit was purchased from previous owners, the plaintiff assumed
the previous owners' liability on a promissory note.
13.

Each plaintiff that testified conceded that he or she

was aware from inception that a cooperative apartment unit, and
not a condominium, was being purchased, or that he or she read
the proprietary lease in question before signing the documents.
14.

In any event, all of the plaintiffs knew, or reasonably

should have known, more than three years prior to the initiation
of this action, that they had acquired proprietary leases in a
cooperative apartment project, and not condominiums.
15.

At a special stockholders meeting of NPVC held on

July 21, 1984, the members of NPVC specifically authorized NPVC
to grant an easement to Gregland for access to an adjacent parcel
upon which Gregland intended to construct an apartment complex.
The formal document representing the easement was subsequently
executed by both Gregland and NPVC.
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The cooperative's members

conditioned the grant of the easement on Gregland agreeing to
repair any damage done to the roadway, to the satisfaction of
NPVC, and Gregland providing for compensation to NPVC in the form
of a right to use amenities valued at $57,000 to be constructed
by Gregland.

The resolution authorizing the grant of the ease-

ment was approved by a vote of the members, 51 to 3.
16.

There was no evidence at trial that the grant of the

easement or the maintenance and operation of the apartment
complex constructed by Gregland on the adjacent property in any
way harmed or damaged the plaintiffs or constituted a breach of
the proprietary leases.
17.

NPVC did not have the financial ability to finance or

build Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the originally proposed 198 units.
18.

Rather than diminishing the value of the cooperative

apartment units, the construction and operation of the apartments
by Gregland enhanced the value of the cooperative units and
provided additional amenities for use by the members.
19.

Although the plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that

NPVC had mismanaged the cooperative, or had failed to account for
rent collected from the plaintiffs' tenants, there was no
material evidence at trial supporting these allegations.
20.

The proprietary leases provided for any transfer of

ownership of a lease to be approved by the Board of Directors of
NPVC.

Although some transferees were apparently turned down due

to poor credit, there was no evidence that NPVC either prevented
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a transfer by any of the plaintiffs or imposed any unreasonable
conditions upon a transfer.

There was no evidence that any

plaintiff lost an opportunity to sell his or her cooperative
apartment unit by reason of any provision in the proprietary
leases, the existence of the Gregland/NPVC Proprietary Lease, or
the first Trust Deed in favor of Boston Mutual.
21.

The first Trust Deed in favor of Boston Mutual has

never been in default, and the payments made to Gregland by NPVC
on the Proprietary Lease are sufficient to service that debt.
22.

Although those plaintiffs that attempted to sell their

cooperative apartment units encountered great difficulty, the
evidence established that there is a market in the general sense
for cooperative apartments.

During 1980 and 1981, sixty-five of

the seventy-two units were sold.

During the period from 1980

through 1990, forty-two cooperative apartment units were transferred by members (excluding transfers by Gregland or NPVC).
23.

Until the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of their

promissory notes and maintenance fees, they had the use and
occupancy of the cooperative apartment units.

Except for some

minor complaints, the plaintiffs' use and occupancy of the
apartment units had been undisturbed.
24.

Each of the plaintiffs, except those settling prior to

trial, ceased making payments to NPVC on their promissory notes
and maintenance fees.

In each case, NPVC sent notices of

termination.
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!25.

Subsequent to the plaintiffs' defaults and after having

sent the notices of termination, NPVC collected rents from the
cooperative apartment units and leased the units to third
parties.
26.

Except for the cooperative apartment unit of Randy

Rhodes and Scott Nalder, from approximately the time of sending
the termination notices until trial, NPVC attempted to minimize
its losses by renting out the plaintiffs' units.

In connection

therewith, NPVC charged a monthly maintenance fees of $90.00 per
month and other rental costs, such as cleaning, advertising, etc.
In each instance, the monthly maintenance fees and other rental
costs were recouped from rent proceeds, resulting in a net
benefit to the plaintiffs from NPVC's mitigation efforts.
27.

In February of 1988, the proprietary lease pertaining

to the cooperative apartment unit of Randy Rhodes and Scott
Nalder was sold at a public sale.
28.

Prior to the public sale, notice of the sale was mailed

to Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder.
29.

The notice of public sale (defendant's Exhibit 4) was

also published in the Davis County Clipper on January 27,
February 3, and February 10, 1988.
30.

At the sale, the proprietary lease pertaining to the

cooperative apartment unit of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder was sold
at a public auction, with NPVC being the successful bidder for
the sum of $26,500.
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31.

As of the date of the public sale, the fair value of

the cooperative apartment unit of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder was
$26,500.
32.

Plaintiffs defaulted in the payments due on the

promissory notes and proprietary leases. The amounts owed by
plaintiffs on their promissory notes and proprietary leases are
as follows.
Names

Amount

As of

Randy L. Rhodes &
Scott N. Nalder
Faye Colton (Moore) &
Sean Moore
Roland & Alison Tanner
M. D. & Jolene S. Swensen
Herbert & Harriet Goldman
Greg & Brenda Miyatake
Mark C. & Joyce K. Hunsaker
Zohreh Shahidinejad
Dennis F. & Sharon F. Reeves
Ben J. & Cheryl Herold
Connie Parker

$ 9,579.71

9/10/91

$46,876.62

9/05/91

$39,038.39
$37,604.47
$34,121.09
$36,331.05
$38,955.41
$60,946.09
$44,626.82
$34,413.65
$27,510.91

8/06/91
8/05/91
8/05/91
8/06/91
8/01/91
8/07/91
8/09/91
8/02/91
8/16/91

33.

The promissory notes and proprietary leases contain

provisions for the recovery of attorney's fees and collection
costs in the event of default.
34.

NPVC has incurred reasonable attorney's fees and costs

by reason of plaintiffs' defaults under the promissory notes and
leases, in the aggregate sum of $20,814.54, as established by the
affidavit of defendant's counsel.

Of that sum, plaintiffs are

responsible individually for the following amounts:
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Names

Amount

Randy L. Rhodes & Scott N. Nalder
Faye Colton (Moore) & Sean Moore
Roland & Alison Tanner
M. D. & Jolene S. Swensen
Herbert & Harriet Goldman
Greg & Brenda Miyatake
Mark C. & Joyce K. Hunsaker
Zohreh Shahidinejad
Dennis F. & Sharon F. Reeves
Ben J. & Cheryl Herold
Connie Parker
TOTAL
35.

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,494.94
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96
1,831.96

$20,814.54

The evidence at trial failed to establish any fraud or

dishonesty in the operation of NPVC by the Gregerson.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To the extent constituting conclusions of law, the

foregoing findings of facts are incorporated herein.
2.

NPVC did not materially breach or default under the

terms of the various proprietary leases between NPVC and the
plaintiffs.
3.

Prior to trial, the claims of Landon and Marie Morrell

were dismissed.

Further, prior to trial, plaintiffs James D.

Ovenden and Donna McQuiston Ovenden, Ralph and Joyce Frasier,
Brian Carmack, and Thomas and Karol Pace, entered into settlement
agreements with NPVC, and their claims against NPVC should be
dismissed.
4.

The transactions between plaintiffs and NPVC were and

are supported by good and valuable consideration, and it would
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not be inequitable to enforce the proprietary leases and
promissory notes.
5.

The proprietary leases between plaintiffs and defendant

do not constitute an unreasonable restraint upon alienation, nor
do the proprietary leases, or the covenants contained therein,
violate the rule against perpetuities.
6.

The plaintiffs have breached and defaulted on their

respective promissory notes to NPVC, and on their obligation to
pay monthly maintenance fees under the proprietciry leases.
7.

Except as to plaintiffs Randy Rhodes amd Scott Nalder,

NPVC holds, as collateral for amounts owed by plaintiffs to NPVC,
assignments of the various proprietary leases.
8.

The proprietary lease purchased by Randy Rhodes and

Scott Nalder was pledged as security for their obligations under
the promissory note and proprietary lease.
9.

The method of foreclosing on Rhodes and Nalder's

proprietary lease, including the notice of sale and sale, was
proper.
10.

The foreclosure of the Rhodes and Nalder's proprietary

lease was in all material respects conducted in ci commercially
reasonable manner.
11.

Under the proprietary leases, NPVC had no duty to the

plaintiffs to construct additional cooperative apartment units;
furthermore, plaintiffs suffered no damages by reason of NPVC's
failure to construct additional cooperative apartment units.
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12.

The easement agreement between NPVC and Gregland was

approved by the members of NPVC, and is supported by good and
valuable consideration.
13.

Defendant is entitled to a judgment against plaintiffs

on the Complaint, no cause of action.
14.

Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiffs

(except Rhodes and Nalder) for the amounts set forth in paragraph
32 above (findings of fact), as of the dates indicated therein,
interest, and attorney's fees (in the amounts set forth in
paragraph 34 above (findings of fact)), and for an order of sale
of the proprietary leases pledged as security for said amounts.
Plaintiffs are entitled to credit for amounts collected from
rents from the cooperative apartment units, net of expenses, from
said dates to the dates of sale.
15.

As to plaintiffs Randy L. Rhodes and Scott N. Nalder,

NPVC is entitled to judgment for the deficiency owed on the
promissory note and proprietary leases, after application of the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale, in the sum of $9,579.71, plus
interest, and attorneys' fees of $2,494.94.
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DATED this

/

day of

Approved:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Bryce D. Panzer
Attorney for Defendant
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Bryce E. Roe
Attorney for Plaintiffs
BDP589
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